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AN EXTERNAL
ECONOMIC POLICY FOR SOUTH AFRICA
1. Introduction:
hi a world of rapidly changing econo­
mic and political conditions, it is necessary 
to review the external economic policy of 
a country from time to time. On the one 
hand, we in South Africa should take note 
of the economic and political development 
taking place at such a rapid pace in Afri­
ca, and on the other hand, we should also 
pay attention to the modern tendency to 
form international trade hlocs. The pres­
ent state of affairs not only calls for pro­
tection and development of our interna­
tional economic interests, hut also for 
thorough planning of our future economic 
growth and development.
With all this in mind this paper intend­
ed to show that external trade and pay­
ments policy can assist us in achieving 
certain economic and non-economic ends 
or targets generally accepted as desirable, 
to show what these ends are, and finally to 
show that our present policy cannot he 
seen as an optimum policy for achieving 
such ends. In other words, this is an at­
tempt to show that we can change our pre­
sent external economic policy better to 
suit our aims.
First of all, it is necessary, however, 
to review briefly the various policy instru­
ments at our disposal, and then we can at­
tempt to define the desirable targets for 
such a policy. It will then also be 
possible to show in what way our present
external economic policy should l.e chang­
ed.
2. Policy instruments:
This is merely an attempt to make 
an over-all survey of the available policy 
instruments. Any detailed account of the 
funclioning of these instruments will take 
us too far afield.
If we take account of institutional 
circumstances, the various policy measures 
which could possibly be applied almost 
unlimited, but in principle it is possible 
to divide all these measures into two main 
categories, namely (a) indirect and (b) 
direct measures.
(a) Indirect measures:
By indirect measures we mean any 
external economic measures which will 
have an influence on the market circum­
stances and market conditions for inter­
national economic transactions, namely 
measures which will have an indirect 
qualitative influence on the international 
supply and demand for goods, services or 
capital. We may divide these measures into 
two types, namely general and selective 
measures, and each of these can be further 
subdivided as follows:
General measures consist of (i) 
measures which will influence the internal 
purchasing power and therefore the demand 
for imports; (ii) measures which will 
influence the propensity to import and
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to consume; (iii) measures which will have 
a direct influence on relative prices, for 
example, exchange rate manipulations, wage 
rate manipulations and import and export 
subsidies and taxes; (iv) global production 
and investment policies.
Selective measures consist of measures 
in respect of definite products, for example, 
national propaganda, multiple exchange 
rates and any form of taxes and/or 
subsidies; and measures relating to specific 
countries, for example, national propaganda 
(which we are at present experiencing) 
and taxes and/or subsidies.
(b) Direct measures'.
Hy direct measures we mean all external 
economic measures which will have a direct 
influence on the market mechanism, namely 
any economic measures which will bring 
about a direct quantitative restriction on 
demand and/or supply with regard to 
international transactions. These include 
(i) direct import and export control 
measures which may he divided into 
quotas and exchange monopolies, (ii) 
dircct production and consumption restric­
tions such as production or consumption 
permits, and (iii) the volume of direct, 
autonomous, state trading with foreign 
countries. This restriction can also he used 
as general and/or selective.
The interested reader will be able to 
find more detailed discussions of the func­
tioning of these instruments in various text 
books on international economic relations.1)
■i. An optimum external trade policy.
Any attempt at defining an optimum 
policy requires a value judgement. Although 
I do not hold the view that value-judgements 
fall outside the scope of economics, I have 
to admit that the inter-personal comparison
of utility, which is necessary for arriving 
at an optimum policy, has not yet been 
satisfactorily solved. Nevertheless, is is not 
the intention of this paper to formulate 
an optimum external economic policy for 
South Africa, but merely to indicate a few 
policy targets or ends that could be accept­
ed as being generally desirable.
4. Policy targets.
The targets at which any economic 
policy aims can either he economic or 
lion-economic. It is not the intention to 
discuss the non-economic ends, such as 
national defence or social justice, etc., 
because this will lead us very far from 
our actual aim. Nevertheless, it must be 
borne in mind that aspects of practical 
policy can never be isolated in this way. 
Practical policy should be viewed as an 
integrated whole with economic ends and 
economic policy as inseparable aspects. 
Hut then it should be remembered that 
practical policy is an art and not a 
science. However, as any scientifically 
founded practical policy should be built on 
theoretical knowledge, it is necessary to 
make some simplifying assumptions as is 
customary in theoretical analysis.
What then can be regarded as economic 
ends? Perhaps the best known examples of 
economic ends for the purpose of economic 
policy are maximisation of the national 
income, full employment, balance of pay­
ments equilibrium and maximum long- 
period benefit from international trade. 
All these ends can he grouped under two 
broader aims, namely (i) an optimum satis­
faction of human wants with the available 
economic means, and (ii) the realisation 
of an equilibrium rate of growth, namely 
a rate of over-all economic growth which
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shows no fluctuations in the course of 
time and not necessarily a rate of growth 
which shows no fluctuations between the 
various sectors of the national economy.
The first aim embraces a manipulation 
of the level of national income, an optimum 
distribution of that income, full employ­
ment of the factors of production and a 
long-run maximisation of the gains from 
international trade. The second aim em­
braces balance of payments equilibrium 
and also a constant level of employment.
I5y an optimum satisfaction of human 
wants by means of the available economic 
means, we understand a situation where 
no economic subject has any motive to 
change his dispositions. It can be shown 
that such a position arises when the eco­
nomic system, and therefore international 
trade, is wholly competitive. In this case 
the price ratios of goods (and services) 
will correspond to their marginal utility 
ratios and to their marginal cost ratios 
and thus each factor of production will be 
remunerated according to its marginal 
productivity. This optimum situation is of 
a relative nature, however, because the level 
of income and its distribution have to be 
taken as given. At any specific moment 
such an assumption is perhaps not too 
unrealistic but it cannot hold in the long 
run. The level of income (and production) 
as well as the mode of its distribution are 
continually changing. To give a definition 
of an optimum position in this regard is 
more difficult than appears at a first 
glance. The highest possible level of income 
at any given time is, for instance, not 
always the most desirable as it could 
easily happen that such an income could 
lead to a lower average income in the
long run. What we must actually aim at is 
to gel an optimum rate of growth in the 
long run. Explained in greater detail this 
means that the national economy should 
be developed at the highest possible rate 
by means of available factors of produc­
tion. In my opinion one could take it for 
granted that the potential demand for any 
article having any utility at all is almost 
unlimited. Therefore, the limits to econo­
mic development are set by the availability 
of the factors of production in a suitable 
combination to achieve the highest possible 
production and standard of living. Thus, 
although the ultimate aim of economic 
policy is to attain the highest possible 
equilibrium rate of economic growth, or, 
even more remote, to obtain the highest 
possible satisfaction of our wants (economic 
and non-economic) as determined by the 
norms adhered to by us, our immediate 
aim should be to make the most of the 
available factors of production. Our econo­
mic policy, internal as well as external, 
must therefore be aimed at ensuring the 
best long-run use oj our factors of 
production. Hut there is something more 
to this: our policy must also be aimed at 
attaining a level of purchasing-power which 
will enable the demand for consumer goods 
to be at least as high as the supply of 
such goods.
If we apply this a9 our main criteria for 
any policy measures, it will be possible 
to test the adequacy of our present external 
economic policy.
First of all, however, we must make 
sure what these criteria would amount to 
in terms of external trade relationships. 
When will the long-run use of our factors 
of production be improved by our external
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economic relationships? Are there any 
indicators by which we can prove that a 
change is for better or for worse? The only 
indicator which could be of any use in 
measuring productivity of the factors of 
production would be the single factorial 
terms of trade. In other words, an indicator 
of a change in the volume of imports which 
we receive in return for one unit of 
factor input.2) These factorial terms of 
trade multiplied by the change in the 
units of factor input will serve as an 
indicator of the change in the real income 
resulting from any new policy, if the 
effect of such a policy could be isolated.
This indicator should be supplemented 
by the commodity terms of trade and the 
favourable or unfavourable position of the 
balance of payments. These two indicators 
are necessary to give an idea of the change 
in the level of the nominal national income 
as a result of the external trade and pay­
ments position of the country. While the 
factorial terms of trade give an idea of 
changes in the real productivity of the 
country with regard to external economic 
relationships, the last-mentioned indicators 
give some idea of international price 
movements, of the import purchasing power 
of one unit of exports.
One word on a point of procedure will 
now be in order. While testing the present 
policy measures recommendations will 
immediately be made as to how these 
measures could be changed better to suit 
our aims.
I
S. Present policy and recommendations.
a) General policy.
Any historical survey of the develop­
ment of the external economic policy of
the Union of South Africa during the 
past ten to twelve years5) will show a 
marked change from a policy whereby 
external balance was achieved by means 
of exchange rate manipulations and im­
port controls, to a policy where this result 
is aimed at by influencing the propensity 
to import, the purchasing power and the 
volume of exports. There can be no ob­
jection to this policy change in general as 
far as the propensity to import and the 
volume of exports are concerned, but I 
am afraid that this is not the case with 
the use of purchasing power manipula­
tions to achieve external equilibrium. The 
reason for this is obvious. A change in 
purchasing power is par excellence a 
measure whereby internal balance may be 
achieved, but it is obvious that internal 
balance cannot always, especially not in 
the short run, be compatible with external 
balance. It is possible that, under some 
special circumstances, the two aims could 
be achieved simultaneously by means of 
one policy instrument, but this would be 
an exception to the rule.
To use this policy instrument for 
achieving both ends virtually amounts to 
trying to achieve internal and external 
balance simultaneously under a gold 
standard without the necessary internal 
flexibility of wage rates. As long as the 
money-flow within a country is dependent 
upon balance of payments equilibrium 
alone, and vice versa, there is no hope of 
attaining a long run optimum equilibrium 
rate of economic growth. It is clear that 
only where external disequilibrium is the 
result of grave inflationary tendencies in 
the internal economy, will it be possible 
to curb the inflation and at the same time
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restore external balance. Rut even in this 
case it is possible that the policy could meet 
with 110 success if a change in the volume 
of money-flows should lead to a grave 
deterioration in business expectations. In 
the case of a high degree of disequilibrium 
in the balance of payments, which the 
authorities are set to curb by means of 
deflation, this would surely occur bccause 
the marginal propensity to import would 
probably be higher than the average 
propensity. If to this is added oilier signs 
of a decline in world demand and prices, 
and if the demand for the staple exports 
of the country concerned is highly sensitive 
to price changes so that there is a decline 
in the value of exports, a policy lo achieve 
external balance by means of a decline in 
purchasing power would be most harmful 
to internal economic development.
The experience of South Africa in 
1957/5Í5 serves as an example of our 
argument in this connection. The monetary 
authorities of the Union at that time en­
forced a cut in purchasing power by their 
most forceful instrument, namely a change 
in cash reserves required hy the Reserve 
Rank from the commercial banks. The 
chief aim of this policy was to obtain 
greater external balance and at the same 
time curb internal inflationary tendencies. 
The policy met with reasonable success 
with regard to the first aim, but the resul­
tant contraction in the internal cconomy 
was clearly too extensive because of this 
policy and other changes in the interna­
tional economy. If this policy had been 
consistently pursued as originally planned, 
it could have been disastrous.
It must be obvious therefore that for 
the system to be stable and for a reason­
able chance of success the number of 
instruments should at least be the same as 
the number of targets to be achieved.
On the other hand, it is equally clear 
that we cannot return to the policy pre­
viously pursued. To maintain external 
balance by means of import controls is at 
best a short-period measure because it will 
call for retaliatory measures in the long 
run; furthermore, it is diametrically oppos­
ed to the present views on international 
economic development and co-operation. 
Above all, however, it is also unsound 
policy if guaged according to our agreed 
policy aims, for it will not result in the 
greatest possible satisfaction of needs.
Exchange rate manipulation is even 
more difficult than import control in that 
it is effective only within certain limits. 
Even if effective, it is a most delicate 
instrument which should be handled with 
the utmost care and discretion.4)
What then will be the right line of 
approach to this problem? The answer to 
this question cannot be given in a single 
slogan.
First of all, it is necessary to review 
some of our present trade agreements and 
to get a clear picture of our place in 
present integrative tendencies in the inter­
national economic sphere. The next step 
is to see what we can do by means of 
external economic policy lo raise our 
productivity and the volume of our exports, 
and also to see how our imports could be 
lowered in a way which would not deprive 
us of tlie benefits of free trade, which 
would not call for retaliatory measures and 
which would not lead to internal disequili­
brium. At the same time, however, we 
should also make sure that the composition
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of imports and exports is such that we 
would derive the greatest possible advan­
tage from international trade. Next we 
wish to say a few words about the influenc­
ing of capital flows.
(b) Trade agreements.
The only general trade agreements of 
importance to us for policy purposes are 
the system of Imperial Preferences (I.P.) 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (G.A.T.T.). South African is a sig­
natory to both these agreements.
(i) Imperial Preference.
The present policy of the system of 
I.P. was formulated mainly at the Ottawa 
Conference in 1932. But even before 1932 
we have a long history of the same policy. 
It has been inherited from two sources, 
namely on the one hand, the British 
Mercantilism of the seventeenth century 
and, on the other, the British desire to 
build a political empire —  a desire dating 
from the same period. It is, however, not 
(he intention to make an historical survey 
of the development of the system or of its 
historical merits or demerits as far as 
South Africa is concerned.5)
It is the intention to reply to only two 
questions: I. Is our membership of the 
I.P. system to our best advantage? 2. What 
do the advantages really amount to? We 
will reply to the last question first.
As will lie seen from Table 1, Soulh 
Africa enjoyed contractual preferences from 
llie United Kingdom in 1957 on products 
worth .M3 million. This, however, accounts 
for only 29 of ihe 67 items on which con­
tractual preference is accorded. In other 
words, 38 of these items may be considered
as being of less importance with a money 
value of £2.2 million. If we assume that 
all duties would be payable by the expor­
ters in the absence of I.P. (which is highly 
improbable), the calculated benefit amounts 
to less than £4 million. According to the 
table, the 29 items included — with only 
one exception — consist of agricultural and 
forestry products for which our own de­
mand, in some instances, is outstripping 
our suply.
With the exception of South African 
fresh fruit, the abolition of I.P. will pro­
bably not even influence the volume of 
trade with the United Kingdom, since it 
is either produce for which a world demand 
exists or else it is produce in the pro­
duction of which we have a comparative 
advantage with regard to the quality and 
availability of raw material.
In the case of our fresh fruit, expor­
ters have come to rely on the United 
Kingdom market to such extent that they 
did not take enough trouble to develop other 
markets, but it does not follow that it is 
impossible to do so now.
The only other benefit from I.P. which 
cannot be denied, is that the long history 
of trade and political contacts between 
South Africa and the United Kingdom 
enabled the Union to build up a substan­
tial and valuable goodwill in the United 
Kingdom market.
In order to be able to answer our first 
question, we must enumerate against these 
advantages all the disadvantages of the
I.P. system to South Africa.
Probably the greates disadvantage of 
the system is that South Africa is dependent 
on a market which may collapse at any
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TABLE I.
Imports from South Africa by the United Kingdom, of the most important items on 
which a preference is accorded to S.A. and other Commonwealth Countries during 1957.
(Contractual preferences only
U.K.
Tariff Description
I tein
(1) (2)
0 4 .0 3 Butter
04.05 Eggs in shell
0 3.0 3 Crawfish, canned
10.05 Mealies, flat white
11.01 Mealie Meal
08.02 Oranges, sweet, fresh
08.06 Apples, fresh
08.04 Grapes, fresh
08.07 Peaches, etc., fresh
08.06 Pears, fresh
08.12 Apricots, dried
08.07 Plums, fresh
08.04 Raisins and sultanas
20.06 Apricots, canned
20.06 Peaches, canned
20.06 Pears, canned
20.06 Pineapples, canned
20.06 Fruitsalad, canned.
20.07 Grape juce
20.07 Fruit juice, oLlier
11.08 Maize starch
17.01 Sugar, unrefined
22.05 Wine, light
22.05 Wine, heavy
24.01 Tobacco, unmanufact.
12.01 Groundnuts
25.24 Asbestos, crude
15.04 Sperm oil, unrefin.
32.01 Wattle bark, extr.
Value of Imports Calculated
from South Africa value of
%  of 
Total
benefit to S.A.
£ Imports £
(3) (4) (5)
273,274 .27 15,735
345,768 17.8 15,029
165,562 100.0 16,556
3,511,322 73.3 351,132
2,548,227 78.1 254,823
8,261,820 39.2 412,890
2,394,558 16.6 109,580
2,342,930 46.0 187,419
117,004 13.7 11,700
1,481,720 30.6 75,163
80,696 22.2 2,412
193,005 26.9 11,490
149,505 1.6 11,610
1,390,340 69.3 166,840
3,856,614 51.3 462,794
1,130,992 19.5 135,719
2,162,907 30.4 84,864
678,259 56.9 17,858
133,935 39.8 13,394
262,796 38.1 26,279
253,346 10.2 19,000
4,785,207 3.0 413,364
61,070 1.1 13,535
776,019 9.3 240,743
105,955 .10 44,533
1,725,250 9.6 172,525
1,590,138 15.9 159,014
379,381 30.1 37,938
1,899,583 85.3 189,985
43,057,183 3,673,897
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Column (5) as a percentage of column (3): 8.5%.
Sources: (1) Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Com­
monwealth Countries and Foreign Countries, 1957, Volume II.
(2) Trade Agreement between the Union of South Africa and the United 
Kingdom, Treaty Series, No. 11 (1932), Pretoria, 1934.
(3) //. M. Customs and Excise Tariff of the United Kingdom, London, 
1958.
(4) The British Commonwealth, Commonwealth Preference and the Sterl­
ing Area, Federation of British Industries, London, 1958.
moment. Recent developments as regards
I lie integration movement in Western 
Europe make it quite clear that Britain 
will he forced to choose between the Com­
monwealth — especially the I.P. system — 
and Europe. As it is, „the United King­
dom seemed to be Mr. Facing-both-ways, 
looking towards the Commonwealth and 
to Europe, not knowing which road to 
take”.7) Economic as well as political 
reasons will, however, force the United 
Kingdom lo choose Europe. Thus, the soon­
er we become accustomed to the idea of 
competition without the I.P. aid, the better 
it will be for us.
But not only should we keep in mind 
the shock South African economy would 
experience if this market were to collapse, 
but that the I.P. has some most important 
indirect disadvantages to our economy. 
The sheltered markets enjoyed by some of 
our industries under the system of Imperial 
Preference have led to a distortion of our 
economic structure. Because of the special 
benefits which could be derived in the 
protected industries, factors of production 
which could have been employed for the 
production of truly competitive products,
were lured away to this ostensibly bene­
ficial employment. This is the case with 
our wine, wattle bark and pulp and hard- 
board industries. Take, for example, the 
case of the South African wine industry. 
Production patterns in this industry were 
of the long-run type, and according to the 
preferences granted during the period 
1932— 1939, a large heavy-wine industry 
was developed. In 1939 to 1947 the pre­
ferences changed in favour of light wines 
and from 1949 to 1958 this changed pat­
tern was accentuated to an even greater 
extent. This resulted in long-run produc­
tion surpluses of heavy wines and it could 
also happen in other industries. Any change 
in the United Kingdom policy with regard 
to preferences could result in large South 
African surpluses. This distortional effect 
can disturb our whole national economy 
and cannot be tolerated.
Worse even than the disadvantages 
mentioned so far, is the fact that I.P. has 
hampered the formulation of an indepen­
dent external economic policy. This is 
brought about in two ways. The first is an 
indirect impediment, namely that our 
leaders became accustomed to the idea that
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Britain would negotiate on our behalf if 
necessary or, in any event, that Britain 
would protect our interests. The second is 
a direct impediment. I.P. in general crea­
tes the impression of discrimination against 
third countris. Let us, for instance, take 
the long list of 67 items to which 
preferences are accorded although not 
more than 29 amount to anything 
worth-while. To be more specific, we 
are unable, as a result of I.P., to bargain 
for our own interest with international 
blocs such as the European Economic Com­
munity. We are also unable to adopt a more 
aggressive trade policy towards indepen­
dent countries. In other words, we are not 
allowed —  out of our own free will —  to 
make the most of our bargaining position 
in the international economic world.
Our bargaining position with regard 
to Britain is particularly good. We have a 
very large trade deficit with the United 
Kingdom, so that we would be able to bene­
fit in almost all aspects of any new agree­
ments which could be entered into with 
them. Negotations would in any event 
result in a net benefit to South Africa.
A very grave and real disadvantage, 
moreover, is the fact that exportation to 
a sheltered market would almost certainly 
reduce our compentitiveness in the short 
run and that could spell complete ruination 
in the long run if competition were sud­
denly to be forced upon us.
From the foregoing arguments it should 
be clear that the sooner we break away 
from the I.P. system, the better it would 
be for our economy. (To break away from 
the I.P. system will not be so difficult now 
because we are na longer a member of the 
Commonwealth). By breaking away we
would surely be better able to attain the 
economic ends desired by us.
(ii) G.A.T.T.
It is common knowledge that this 
agreement is based on the principle of the 
“most-favoured-nation treatment” and that 
it aims at a reduction or elimination of 
tariffs on a reciprocal basis.
South Africa, as member of this 
agreement, is forced to comply with its 
articles. Consequently it exerts a consider­
ably influence on our present external 
economic policy.
The free-trade principle which is the 
main principle of the G.A.T.T. philosophy 
is, however, not successful under the 
present world economic conditions, mainly 
as a result of the difference in the level 
of development of the economies of the 
member countries. A country with a low 
level of economic development can hardly 
stimulate industrial development without 
applying tariffs or other discriminatory 
measures. For that matter, free trade is 
possible only if the following conditions 
are satisfied:8)
1. If a co-ordinated monetary and 
cyclical policy is followed between the 
countries concerned, because this would 
be the only long-run possibility for balance 
of payments equilibrium.
2. If competition between the coun­
tries concerned is given a free hand.
3. If special aid is granted to under­
developed member countries.
4. If a joint policy is pursued with 
regard to trade with non-member coun­
tries and also with regard to competition
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between member countries in the outside 
market.
This is very far removed from the 
present position in international economic 
relationships. The United States of Ame­
rica, the most developed and richest of 
the member countries, has for instance 
maintained a most restictive and protec­
tionist economic policy. No advancement 
in the direction of free trade could, how­
ever, be expected unless America were to 
change her internal and external economic 
policy. America is taking up a very firm 
stand in connection with the principle of 
reduction in trade barriers on a reciprocal 
basis, and as long as this policy is maintain­
ed, it would be unfair to countries which 
initially had a low level of protection.
What is even worse for the South 
African position is that the great industrial 
countries of Europe and America apparent­
ly have no scruples about violating the 
spirit of the agreement. We, 011 the other 
hand, follow the G.A.T.T. philosophy most 
meticulously and this is definitely not 
conductive to our own economic develop­
ment.
The whole tendency in practical inter­
national economic relationships is to move 
away from free trade and in the direction 
of bilateral agreements and protection, and 
any delay on our part to follow suit could 
only be to our own detriment.
(c) International integration.
Today we live in an era marked by 
international integration movements. What 
is the position of South Africa in this 
development? From a geographic point of 
view il will be difficult for us to integrate 
with any area in particular, except perhaps 
with Southern Rhodesia, by reason of the
fact that our present political position is 
not acceptable to growing nationalism in 
Africa.
Nevertheless, we could benefit from the 
integration movement in other parts of the 
world if we are willing to adopt a revised 
external economic policy. As a single coun­
try, we will probably be able to find a 
more willing ear in future trade agreements 
lhan if we were to work through the United 
Kingdom.
Il is of vital importance to us to develop 
and maintain the closest possible contact 
with the countries of the Common Market. 
The developments of the last few months 
in the Congo, and further evidence of 
growing nationalism in Africa, will perhaps 
enable us to make closer contact with this 
group. It is not impossible to get the Euro­
pean Six interested in the development of 
our vast raw-material resources to suit 
their own development plans. Once they 
are interested it would not be impossible 
for us to demand, and be accorded, spe­
cial treatment with regard to their outer 
tariff, etc. But as we have previously shown, 
this would call for a revision of our ties 
with Commonwealth countries to enable 
us to formulate an independent policy in 
this direction. Unfortunately, there is a 
marked tendency amongst South African 
leaders to depend on the negotiations of 
the United Kingdom from which we hope 
to benefit indirectly.
It is also necessary for us to seek more 
contact with underdeveloped countries in 
view of the fact that this country is be­
coming progressively industrialised. In the 
case of under-developed countries the bila­
teral agreement, especially agreements of 
the barter type (which is diametrically
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opposed to our present policy) ’) will be 
welcomed.
d) Measures to increase productivity and 
exports.
One thing that we should try to achieve 
by all means, is a rise in our internal 
productivity, for this is the only way of 
improving our international competitive­
ness. External economic policy cannot 
greatly influence our productivity, but the 
least we can do in this regard, by means of 
external policy, is to make sure that we 
export items in respect of which we have 
a comparative advantage, and to import 
those things which we can import more 
cheaply than we can possibly produce them 
ourselves.
A direct consequence of this is that we 
must make better use of our abundant 
supply of raw materials, especially minerals. 
The least we can do is to refine these 
materials as far as possible before export, 
or if the ability of our labour force and 
the export market permit, to use them as 
raw materials in the production of export­
able consumer or investment goods.
In addition to a rise in productivity, 
further measures should be applied to sti­
mulate exports. This could be achieved in 
various ways, but the Government could 
at least be expected to negotiate for 
favourable conditions under which orders 
could be placed.
e) Selective measures to lower imports.
As indicated above, it is necessary to 
have an instrument whereby external ba­
lance could be promoted. This is especially 
true in the case of the influencing of 
imports. Although it is possible to lower 
imports by means of propaganda in favour 
of local substitutes, or at least to allay 
any prejudice against local products, for 
example by means of a our bureau of stan­
dards, it usually calls for a more direct 
measure.
We have, however, already pointed 
out that tariff or direct import control 
is only acceptable as a short-run measure. 
The only long-run measure which could 
be enforced and which is selective enough, 
is a sales tax on items which are not 
regarded as necessities. Because this sales 
tax does not discriminate against imports, 
it will not evoke retaliation from the 
countries whose exports are affected.
C. Conclusion.
It will suffice to make one concluding 
remark. One thing is clear from our argu­
ment, and that is the necessity to formu­
late an independent external economic 
policy capable of being adapted to the 
rapidly changing international economy.
P.U. vir C'.H.O. F. J. du Plessis.
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